In accordance with the methodological maxim that I laid down at the beginning ,I shall approach the question of the demands of intergenerational justice via the question of the demands of distributive justice among contemporaries.The premiss from whi

In accordance with the methodological maxim that I laid down at the beginning ,I shall approach the question of the demands of intergenerational justice via the question of the demands of distributive justice among contemporaries.The premiss from which start is one of the fundanmental equality of hunman beings(It is precisely because this premiss dose mot make moral standing valid for contemporaries are prima facie valid for intergenerational justice too.)Fundamental equality is ,as John Stuart Mill said,"the first principle of morals".Bentham's dictum,"everybody to count for one ,nobody for more than one"is ,as he noted a specific application of it to utilitarian calculus,telling us that pains and pleasures of equal intensity are to be given the same value in the calculus ,regardless of the identity of the person to whom they belong.An application that is not tied to utilitarianism is that different treatments of different people must be justified by adducing some morally relevant ground for different treatment.This is,of course,not saying a great deal until we know what are to count as morally relevant reasons.But even if we simply say that they are grounds which we ought reasonably to expect the person affected to accept freely,we shall rule out many historically prominent forms of domination and systematic inequality of rihgts,which have rested on nothing but the power of the beneficiaries to impose them.
I do not know of any way of providing a justification for the premiss of fundamental equality:its status is that of an axiom.I will point out,however,that it very widely accepted ,at least in theory ,and attempts to provide a rationale for unequal treatment at least pay lip service to the obligation to square it with the premiss of fundamental equality.Moreover,it seems to me that there is a good reason for this in that it is very hard to imagine any remotely plausible basis for rejecting the premiss.In any case ,it is presupposed in what follows.

与我首先提出的方法学格言符合,我通过分配性正义要求的问题将接近两代之间的正义要求的问题在当代之中的.前提开始是一个hunman生存(是精确地的它fundanmental平等,因为这前提药量mot做站立的道德合法为初步印象是合法为两代之间正义也是.)根本平等是的当代,约翰・斯图尔特磨房说,“道德的基本原理”.Bentham的宣言,“计数的大家为一个,没人为超过一个"是,他注意了一种具体应用它对功利主义的微积分,告诉我们将给相等的强度痛苦和乐趣在微积分的同一价值,不管他们属于人的身分.没有被栓对功利主义的应用是必须通过举例另外治疗的一些道德上相关的地面辩解另外人民的不同的治疗.这,当然,非常不说,直到我们知道什么将算作是道德上相关的原因.但是,即使我们说他们是我们的地面 应该合理地期待人受影响自由地接受,我们将排除控制权和rihgts的系统的不平等的许多历史上突出的形式,基于受益人的力量强加他们.
I不知道提供辩解任何方式为根本平等前提：它的状态是那公理.然而,我将指出它至少在理论和尝试上非常广泛接受了,为至少不同等的治疗薪水空口的应酬话提供理论基础给义务摆正它与根本平等前提.而且,以我所见有此的一个充足的理由因为想象为拒绝前提的所有遥远地振振有词的依据是非常难.无论如何,在什么被预料跟随

根据该方法的格言，我放下开始时，我将这个问题的办法的要求，通过代际正义的问题，要求分配正义的前提之一.从开始是一个平等人（正是因为这个前提剂量年检作出的道德标准有效期为同时代的表面有效期为世代正义也。 ）基本平等的，因为弥尔说， “第一项原则的道德” 。边沁的格言： “每个人都指望一个，没有人不止一个“是，他指出，具体应用到功利演算，告诉我们，痛苦和欢乐的平等强度要给予同等价值的演算，不论身份人，...

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根据该方法的格言，我放下开始时，我将这个问题的办法的要求，通过代际正义的问题，要求分配正义的前提之一.从开始是一个平等人（正是因为这个前提剂量年检作出的道德标准有效期为同时代的表面有效期为世代正义也。 ）基本平等的，因为弥尔说， “第一项原则的道德” 。边沁的格言： “每个人都指望一个，没有人不止一个“是，他指出，具体应用到功利演算，告诉我们，痛苦和欢乐的平等强度要给予同等价值的演算，不论身份人，他们应用，无关功利的是，不同治疗方法的不同的人必须是有道理的某些举证有关的地面道义上的不同当然，不是说了很多，直到我们都知道是什么指望作为道德有关即使我们简单地说，他们的理由，我们理应期待受影响的人士接受自由，我们应排除许多历史上著名的形式的支配和系统不平等的，这取决于只不过权力的受益者强加他们。
我不知道任何方式提供了一个道理的前提的基本平等的：它的地位是一个I会指出，然而，它非常普遍接受的，至少在理论上，并试图提供一个理由对于不平等的待遇，至少在口头上的义务平方米它的基本前提，但在我看来，有一个很好的理由，因为这是很难想象任何可信的基础远程拒绝任何情况下，它是在什么先决条件如下

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